

Introduction to Jonathan Edwards

1. Introduction

Resources on Edwards

George Marsden, *Jonathan Edwards: A Life* (Yale, 2003)

Biographies by Perry Miller (1949) and Iain Murray (1987)

John Piper, *God's Passion for His Glory: Living the Vision of Jonathan Edwards* (Crossway)¹

Yale editions of Edwards's works

<http://edwards.yale.edu/>

An intellectual giant

Edwards was extraordinary. By many estimates, he was the most acute early American philosopher and the most brilliant of all American theologians. At least three of his many works – *Religious Affections*, *Freedom of the Will*, and *The Nature of True Virtue* – stand as masterpieces in the larger history of Christian literature.²

An increasing influence

2. Life and times

Life

Born 1703; descended from C17 immigrants from England; studied at Yale 1716–22; intense religious experiences 1721; Pastor in NY, Boston; taught at Yale; Pastor of church in Northampton 1729; leading role in great awakening; 'Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God' (1741); dismissed from pastorate in Northampton 1750; Pastor in Stockbridge (frontier town) 1751; died 1758 of smallpox vaccination.

¹ Online http://www.desiringgod.org/Store/Books/ByTopic/3/73_Gods_Passion_for_His_Glory/

² Marsden, p. 1.

Times

'Christian' culture

Perilous existence

Religious excitement / revival

Increasing religious nominalism

Rise of rationalism / Deism / Arminianism

Edwards's consuming passion

'Resolutions' (around 1722 onwards)

BEING SENSIBLE THAT I AM UNABLE TO DO ANYTHING WITHOUT GOD' S HELP, I DO HUMBLY ENTREAT HIM BY HIS GRACE TO ENABLE ME TO KEEP THESE RESOLUTIONS, SO FAR AS THEY ARE AGREEABLE TO HIS WILL, FOR CHRIST' S SAKE. ...

4. Resolved, never to do any manner of thing, whether in soul or body, less or more, but *what tends to the glory of God*; nor be, nor suffer it, if I can avoid it.

Marsden:

Edwards directed his "Resolutions" toward plugging every gap that would allow distraction from what he was as his only worthy activity, to glorify God.³

³ Marsden, p. 50.

The End for Which God Created the World

Why did God make the universe?

What is the God's highest and last end in creation?

What is in itself most valuable and attainable by creation is God's ultimate end in creation.

Whatever that be which is in itself most valuable, and was so originally, prior to the creation of the world, and which is attainable by the creation, if there be any thing which was superior in value to all others, that must be worthy to be God's last end in the creation; and also worthy to be his highest end.⁴

Consequently,

God's moral rectitude consists in his valuing the most valuable, namely, himself ... if God has respect to things according to their nature and proportions, he must necessarily have the greatest respect to himself.⁵

How much more worthy is God than all other things?

Edwards asks 'what proportion of regard is to be allotted to the Creator and all his creatures taken together.'⁶

The *Supreme Being*, with all in him that is great and excellent, is to be compared with all that is to be found in the *whole creation*; and according as the former is found to outweigh, in such proportion is he to have a greater share of regard. And in this case, as the whole system of created beings, in comparison of the Creator, would be found as the light dust of the balance, or even as nothing and vanity; so the arbiter must determine accordingly with respect to the *degree* in which God should be regarded. ... And as the Creator is infinite, and has all possible existence, perfection, and excellence, so he must have all possible regard.⁷

Piper:

Is not the essence of righteousness to place supreme value on what is supremely valuable, with all the just actions that follow? And isn't the opposite of righteousness to set our highest affections on things of little or no worth, with all the unjust actions that follow? Thus the righteousness of God is the infinite zeal and joy and pleasure that he has in what is supremely valuable, namely, his own perfection and worth. And if he were ever to act contrary to this eternal passion for his own perfections he would be unrighteous, he would be an idolater.⁸

⁴ Edwards, *The End for Which God Created the World*, in John Piper, *God's Passion for His Glory*, p. 140.

⁵ Edwards, *The End*, p. 140

⁶ Edwards, *The End*, p. 143.

⁷ Edwards, *The End*, p. 143, italics original.

⁸ John Piper, *The Pleasures of God*.

What biblical support could be adduced for Edwards's conclusion?

Some further questions

Can God do *anything*? Is there anything he *cannot* do? What? Why?

What factors influenced God to make precisely this universe?

Does God always accomplish what he intends? Why or why not?

Is it possible that a universe other than this one could have glorified God *more* than this one?

Could God have made any universe other than precisely this one?

What other things does God aim at in creating and sustaining the universe?

Jonathan Edwards, 'Miscellany' no. ff

'He who did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us all, how will he not also with him graciously give us all things?' (Romans 8:32)

'So let no one boast in men. For all things are yours, whether Paul or Apollos or Cephas or the world or life or death or the present or the future – all are yours, and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's.' (1 Corinthians 3:21–23)

Union with Christ. By virtue of the believer's union with Christ, he doth really possess all things. That we know plainly from Scripture. But it may be asked, how [doth] he possess all things? What is he the better for it? How is a true Christian so much richer than other men? To answer this, I'll tell you what I mean by 'possessing all things.' I mean that God three in one, all that he is, and all that he has, and all that he does, all that he has made or done – the whole universe, bodies and spirits, earth and heaven, angels, men and devils, sun moon, [and] stars, land and sea, fish and fowls, all the silver and gold, kings and potentates as well as mean men – are as much the Christian's as the money in his pocket, the clothes he wears, or the house he dwells in, or the victuals he eats; yea, more properly his, more advantageously, more his than if he [could] command all those things mentioned to be just in all respects as he pleased at any time, by virtue of the union with Christ; because Christ, who certainly doth thus possess all things, is entirely his: so that he possesses it all, more than a wife the share of the best and dearest husband, more than the hand possesses what the head doth; it is all his.

The universe is [his], only he has not the trouble of managing it; but Christ, to whom it is no trouble, manages it for him a thousand times as much to his advantage as he could himself, if he had the managing of all. Every atom in the universe is managed by Christ so as to be most to the advantage of the Christian, every particle of air or every ray of the sun; so that he in the other world, when he comes to see it, shall sit and enjoy all this vast inheritance with surprising, amazing joy. And how is it possible for a man to possess anything more than so as shall be most to his advantage? And then besides this, the Christian shall have everything managed just according to his will; for his will shall so be lost in the will of God, that he had rather have it according to God's will than any way in the world. And who would desire to possess all things more than to have all things managed just according to his will? And then besides, he himself shall so use them as to be most to his own advantage in his thoughts, and meditations, etc.

Now how is it possible for anyone to possess anything more than to have it managed as much as possible according to his will, as much as possible for his own advantage, and for himself to use it [as] much as possible according to his advantage? But it is certain, so much shall the true Christian possess all things; 'tis not a probable scheme, but absolutely certain. For we know that all things will be managed so as shall be most agreeable to his will. That can't be denied, nor that it shall be most for his advantage, and that he himself shall use [it] most to his own advantage. This is the kingdom Christ so often promised – they shall be kings with a witness at this rate! This is the sitting in Christ's throne, and inheriting all things promised to the victors in the Revelation, and the like in many other places.⁹

⁹ Edwards, *Works*, vol. 13, pp. 183–185.

The Freedom of the Will

*What's really going to bake your noodle later on is,
would you still have broken it if I hadn't said anything?
(Oracle, The Matrix)*

Are human beings free?

The importance of human 'freedom'

The issue of human freedom in Edwards's day

Marsden:

"I think the notion of liberty, consisting in a contingent self-determination of the will, as necessary to the morality of men's dispositions and actions," he wrote to John Erskine in 1757, "*almost inconceivably pernicious.*" "The contrary truth," however, was "*one of the most important truths of moral philosophy that was ever discussed.*" If modern notions prevailed on this matter, then the game was up for Calvinism. "For allow these adversaries what they maintain on this point, and I think they have strict demonstration against us."¹⁰

The issue of human freedom in the contemporary world

Marsden:

The emphasis on the individual's wholly unfettered free will was part of what is sometimes characterized as the invention of the modern self ... [In Edwards' day,] a political and social revolution was nearly at hand ... Individuals, especially adult men, were beginning to think of themselves as self-defined. Essential to self-definition was unfettered choice.¹¹

Calvinism, Arminianism and Open Theism

¹⁰ Marsden, pp. 437–438, italics added.

¹¹ Marsden, p. 438.

'Liberty of indifference' – the Arminian doctrine of human freedom

Definition

Walls and Dongell:

The essence of this view is that a free action is one that does not have a sufficient condition or cause prior to its occurrence.¹²

Reichenbach: Liberty of indifference is the ability of a person to 'have chosen to do otherwise than he did.'¹³

Liberty of indifference entails a denial of determinism in respect of human actions

Walls and Dongell: Determinism is 'the view that every event must have happened exactly as it did because of prior conditions,' such that 'these prior events and circumstances represent a *sufficient condition* for the event to occur'¹⁴

1. 'Liberty of indifference is necessary for moral responsibility'

Key philosophical plank of the Arminian case

The Arminian argument:

A person can only be *morally responsible* for an action if he *performed* it, which is equivalent to saying that he must have exercised a *necessary influence* upon it, which means that the action cannot have been exhaustively determined by factors beyond his control.

2. 'Denying liberty of indifference makes God the author of evil'

The Arminian argument:

Denying liberty of indifference implies that all human actions are causally determined by antecedent factors. Thus every sin can be traced back through a 'chain' of secondary causes to God, the only uncaused cause.

Affirming liberty of indifference exonerates God from blame by ascribing evil to the human will *independently* of antecedent determining factors. God granted liberty of indifference to Adam, and it therefore became possible for him to sin, but God did not *cause* him to do so, and was therefore not morally responsible. Adam sinned *freely*.

¹² Jerry L. Walls and Joseph R. Dongell, *Why I Am Not a Calvinist* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004), p. 103.

¹³ Bruce R. Reichenbach, 'Freedom, Justice and Moral Responsibility', in *The Grace of God, The Will of Man*, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Grand Rapids: Academie, 1989), p. 285.

¹⁴ Walls and Dongell, *Why I Am Not a Calvinist*, p. 99, italics original.

3. 'The Bible says that human liberty of indifference explains why not all are saved'

All agree that God has 'two wills' regarding salvation¹⁵

- (1) God 'wants all men to be saved' (1 Timothy 2:4); cf. Ezekiel 18:23, 2 Peter 3:9; Matthew 23:27–29
- (2) Not all people are in fact saved

Piper:

The difference between Calvinists and Arminians lies not in whether there are two wills in God, but in what they say the higher commitment is.¹⁶

The Arminian argument:

The Bible teaches that the *reason* why some are not saved is that they (freely) choose to reject Christ

Matthew 23:37; Luke 7:30

4. 'The Bible's universal call to repentance implies a universal ability to respond'

The Arminian argument:

The 'natural' reading is that those God exhorts to repent are capable of doing so

'Liberty of spontaneity' – the Calvinist doctrine of human freedom

Summary: We are free to do what we want

A person's will always follows the strongest apparent motive.

By "motive," I mean that whole of that which moves, excites or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly.¹⁷

The will is *determined* by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable.¹⁸

Motives can be external or internal

Without the influence of motives, a person never 'wills' anything. The will is not the capacity to 'generate' choices, but rather the capacity to respond volitionally to motives.

'Freedom' consists in the ability to act according to our will, which is equivalent to doing what we want.

¹⁵ John Piper, 'Are There Two Wills in God?', in *Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge and Grace*, ed. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A Ware (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995), pp. 107–31.

¹⁶ Piper, 'Are There Two Wills in God?', p. 124.

¹⁷ Edwards, *Freedom of the Will*, p. 141.

¹⁸ Edwards, *Freedom of the Will*, p. 144.

Response to Arminian arguments

1. 'Liberty of indifference is necessary for moral responsibility'

Assertion, not argument

Arminians misconceive the nature of the will, imagining it to be a 'thing' located 'inside' the human person. The argument then runs like this: 'If I'm not in control of my will, then how can I be accountable for its decisions and the actions that result? Since I am accountable for my actions, I must be in control of my will, which means (1) that I must have had the decisive "say" in what my will decided, with the "power of contrary choice"; and (2) that determinism must be wrong.'

Against this, Edwards insists that 'the will' is a capacity, or 'faculty' of the person, not something 'inside' us and distinct from us. When we say 'a person's will is x', we mean strictly speaking that 'a person wills x'. Freedom is 'the property of an agent,'¹⁹ not of 'the will' as such. A person is free in this sense if he is able to follow the strongest apparent motive.

On this basis, he argues that a person is responsible for an action if he wills the action.

When a thing is *from* a man, in that sense, that it is from his will or choice, he is to blame for it, because his will is *in it*: so far as his will is *in it*, blame is *in it*, and no further.²⁰

Moral responsibility thus requires not the power of contrary choice, but merely consent to the action performed.

Illustration: The red and blue doors

2. 'Denying liberty of indifference makes God the author of evil'

Accept that the problem of evil's origin is difficult

Arminianism cannot explain the origin of evil. Two options:

Either (1) They could trace each evil act to an antecedent evil act. Same position as the Calvinist.

Or (2) They could postulate a unique, initial evil act. But this misunderstands the nature of the human will, for the will cannot *generate* choices, only respond to motives.

¹⁹ Edwards, *Freedom of the Will*, p. 163.

²⁰ Edwards, *Freedom of the Will*, p. 427, italics original.

Edwards never solved it satisfactorily. Storms:

Edwards [is] unwilling to explain how Adam fell [...] in that his deterministic concept of human volition, if consistently applied, must trace every effect in the universe, and therefore every act of will, to the ultimate, all-sufficient, uncaused cause, the eternal deity.²¹

Maybe there's a good reason why evil's origin is inexplicable. Blocher:

We do not understand the why of evil. But we can understand that we cannot understand. [...] Seeking its causal explanation, its ontological reason, its why, is tantamount to seeking, by the very nature of that seeking, to reconcile it with the rest, in other words to justify it. (The 'rest' is in fact what is 'just'.) To understand evil would be to understand that evil is not ultimately evil. The French have a saying, that to understand all is to forgive all; here, understanding all would mean to excuse everything.²²

3. 'The Bible says that human liberty of indifference explains why not all are saved'

The texts cited in support of the Arminian position do not conflict with the Calvinist position.

Calvinists agree that people choose to reject Christ, affirming in addition that God sovereignly determines this choice.

God's will to save all people is restrained by his commitment to the glorification of his sovereign grace.²³

Numerous other texts teach that God's sovereign decree lies behind human choices.

God's decree of reprobation: Romans 9:22–24

God's sovereign will lies behind all human actions: Acts 18:21; 1 Cor 4:19; 16:7

God's sovereign will lies behind individual repentance: 2 Tim 2:25

These texts are irreconcilable with the Arminian position

²¹ C. Samuel Storms, *Tragedy in Eden: Original Sin in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards* (Lanham/New York/London: University Press of America: 1985), p. 224 (see further pp. 206–24).

²² Henri Blocher, *Evil and the Cross*, trans. David G. Preston (Leicester: Apollos, 1994), p. 103.

²³ Piper, 'Are There Two Wills in God?', p. 130.

4. 'The Bible's universal call to repentance implies a universal ability to respond'

Assertion, not argument

Distinguish *natural ability* from *moral ability*

All people have the *natural ability* to repent

Only those called by God have the *moral ability* to repent

Biblical counter argument – Moses speaking to Israel:

This commandment that I command you today is *not too hard for you*, neither is it far off.
(Deuteronomy 30:11)

I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse. Therefore *choose life*, that you and your offspring may live, loving the LORD your God, obeying his voice and holding fast to him
(Deuteronomy 30:19–20)

I know that after my death *you will surely act corruptly and turn aside from the way that I have commanded you*. (Deuteronomy 31:29)

The LORD knew that 31:29 was true when he commanded Moses to speak 30:19–20!

Further problems with the Arminian position

'Liberty of indifference' as defined by Arminians is nonsensical

The Arminian position implies either infinite regress or unique initial act of will

For Arminians, each act of will is determined not by motives but solely by an antecedent act of will. This implies:

Either (1) Infinite regress, implying that creation is eternal

Or (2) Unique initial act of will, determined by something else, which undercuts the whole system

Problems in the new creation

For Arminians, liberty of indifference must be man's highest good, for God chooses to preserve this at the cost of condemning some to hell rather than causing all to be saved.

So, will we have liberty of indifference in the New Creation?

Yes? Then sin will be possible in the New Creation.

No? then we will be deprived of our highest good in the New Creation.

The Arminian position makes man's highest good something that God does not have

According to Arminians, 'God can never determine a human decision [...] God can only will what he foresees will happen through the agency of human beings. Thus, human decision is logically prior to and determinative of the divine will. The human will is free, but the divine is not.'²⁴

The Arminian position undermines God's grace in salvation

Logically implied; not necessarily believed in practice

By making the human will determinative, the divine will is rendered contingent. We are responsible for our own salvation

The Arminian doctrine of 'prevenient grace' simply makes matters worse

Definition: 'Prevenient grace' = 'grace that precedes', enabling the human response

Is prevenient grace resistible?

Yes? Then it's insufficient for salvation, so salvation is a work of man

No? Then it violates the Arminian doctrine of liberty of indifference!

²⁴ Peterson and Williams, *Why I am Not an Arminian*, p. 140.

Original Sin

*You take the red pill and you stay in Wonderland and I show you how deep the rabbit-hole goes.
Remember—all I am offering is the truth, nothing more.
(Morpheus, The Matrix)*

Taylor's challenge to Edwards (*Original Sin* IV.3)

Objection

That great objection against the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity considered, that such imputation is unjust and unreasonable, inasmuch as Adam and his posterity are not one and the same.²⁵

Initial response

God, in each step of his proceeding with Adam [...] looked on his posterity as being one with him.²⁶

Further objection

A critic will simply question 'the *reasonableness*, of such a constitution, by which Adam and his posterity should be looked upon as one,' on the grounds 'that Adam and his posterity are *not one*, but entirely *distinct agents*.'²⁷

The divine constitution, a critic would maintain, implies '*falsehood*, and contradiction to the true nature of things; as hereby they are viewed and treated as one, who are not one, but wholly distinct; and no arbitrary constitution can ever make that to be true, which in itself considered is not true.'²⁸

²⁵ Edwards, *Original Sin*, p. 389.

²⁶ Edwards, *Original Sin*, p. 389.

²⁷ Edwards, *Original Sin*, p. 394.

²⁸ Edwards, *Original Sin*, p. 397.

Edwards's solution: Occasionalism

The seeming force of the objection arises from ignorance or inconsideration of the degree, in which created identity or oneness with past existence, in general, depends on the sovereign constitution and law of the Supreme Author and Disposer of the universe.²⁹

God's upholding created substance, or causing its existence in each successive moment, is altogether equivalent to an *immediate production out of nothing*, at each moment.³⁰

What exists at this moment [...] is a *new effect*; and simply and absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence.³¹

Thus it appears, if we consider matters strictly, there is no such thing as any identity or oneness in created objects, existing at different times, but what depends on *God's sovereign constitution*. And so it appears, that the objection [...] is built on a false hypothesis: for it appears, that a *divine constitution* is the thing which *makes truth*, in affairs of this nature.³²

Strengths of Edwards's solution

1. It upholds divine sovereignty

2. It remains essentially federalist

3. It retains the benefits sought by realism

²⁹ Edwards, *Original Sin*, p. 397.

³⁰ Edwards, *Original Sin*, p. 402.

³¹ Edwards, *Original Sin*, p. 402.

³² Edwards, *Original Sin*, p. 404.

4. It upholds immediate imputation

5. It recognises different kinds of oneness

6. It relates oneness and common properties

Problems with Edwards's position

1. It denies secondary causation, thus making God the author of sin

2. It conflicts with the Special Theory of Relativity

3. It conflicts with divine eternity

An alternative proposal

God sovereignly upholds the entire four-dimensional spatiotemporal universe, and 'sees' all created things as 'atemporally present' to him. The universe is filled with four-dimensional objects – 'hunks' of matter. God confers properties on these objects, and in keeping with these properties he also ordains different kinds of 'oneness' (identity) within and between them.

Religious Affections

What should a sermon do?

‘When I grow up I want to be a “Bible teacher”’

Edwards on preaching

If it be so, that true religion lies much in the affections, hence we may infer, that such means are to be desired, as have much of a tendency to move the affections. Such books, and such a way of preaching the Word, and administration of ordinances, and such a way of worshiping God in prayer, and singing praises, is much to be desired, as has a tendency deeply to affect the hearts of those who attend these means.³³

2 Problems in New England

Overzealous revivalists

Sceptical rationalists

Outline of *Religious Affections*

Text: ‘Whom having not seen, ye love; in whom, though now ye see him not, yet believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory’ (1 Peter 1:8).

Proposition: ‘True religion, in great part, consists in holy affections.’

Part I: Concerning the nature of the affections and their importance in religion

Part II: Showing what are no certain signs that religious affections are truly gracious, or that they are not

Part III: Showing what are distinguishing signs of truly gracious and holy affections

³³ Edwards, *Religious Affections*, p. 121. See further Edwards, *Religious Affections*, pp. 115–116; Jonathan Edwards, *Some Thoughts Concerning the Revival*, in *The Works of Jonathan Edwards*, vol. 4, ed. C. C. Goen (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 387–388; Jonathan Edwards, *The Works of Jonathan Edwards*, vol. 6, ed. Wallace E. Anderson (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 388.

What are 'affections'?

The mind has two faculties: 'understanding' and 'inclination' ('inclination' = 'will')

Strong exercises of inclination = 'affections':

The affections are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercised of the inclination and will of the soul.³⁴

Holy affections have a cognitive aspect:

Holy affections are not heat without light; but evermore arise from some information of the understanding, some spiritual instruction that the mind receives, some light or actual knowledge.³⁵

Ten arguments for the centrality of the affections

1. The Bible says so

God, in his Word, greatly insists upon it, that we be in good earnest, fervent in spirit, and our hearts vigorously engaged in religion.³⁶

E.g. Deut 6:4
Deut 10:12
Luke 24:32
Rom 12:11

2. Affections are the source of our actions

Recall the relationship between will and affections

3. Affections drive sinners to Christ

I am bold to assert, that there never was any considerable change wrought in the mind or conversation of any one person, by anything of a religious nature, that ever he read, heard or saw, that had not his affections moved.³⁷

³⁴ Edwards, *Religious Affections*, p. 96.

³⁵ Edwards, *Religious Affections*, p. 266.

³⁶ Edwards, *Religious Affections*, p. 99.

³⁷ Edwards, *Religious Affections*, p. 102.

4. Scripture locates true religion in the affections

The Holy Scriptures do everywhere place religion very much in the affections; such as fear, hope, love, hatred, desire, joy, sorrow, gratitude, compassion and zeal.³⁸

E.g. fear, hope, love, hatred, joy, sorrow, gratitude, compassion, zeal

Joy Ps 37:4
Ps 97:12
Ps 33:1
Phil 3:1
1 Th 5:16

5. Scripture locates true religion supremely in love

E.g. Mt 22:37–40
Rom 13:8, 10
Gal 5:14
1 Cor 13

6. Examples of biblical characters

David Just read the Psalms!
Paul 2 Cor 2:4; Phil 4:1; etc
John

7. The example of Jesus

He whom God send into the world, to be ... the perfect example of true religion and virtue, for the imitation of all ... was a person who was remarkably of a tender and affectionate heart; and his virtue was expressed very much in the exercise of holy affections.³⁹

E.g. Jn 2:17
Mk 3:5
Lk 19:41–42

³⁸ Edwards, *Religious Affections*, p. 102.

³⁹ Edwards, *Religious Affections*, p. 111.

8. The religion of heaven

'The religion of heaven,' where there is doubtless true religion, 'consists very much in affection; and therefore undoubtedly, true religion consists very much in affection.'

9. The nature of ordinances

'The nature and design of the ordinances and duties, which God hath appointed, as means and expressions of true religion'⁴⁰ appear to be designed to stimulate the affections.

E.g. prayer
singing
the sacraments
preaching

10. Lack of true religion is identified as hardness of heart

'Tis an evidence that true religion, or holiness of heart, lies very much in the affection of the heart, that the Scriptures place the sin of the heart very much in hardness of heart.⁴¹

By a hard heart, is plainly meant an unaffected heart, or a heart not easy to be moved with virtuous affections.⁴²

Implications

Positively: A challenge to cerebral evangelicalism

Negatively: The problem of assurance

⁴⁰ Edwards, *Religious Affections*, p. 114.

⁴¹ Edwards, *Religious Affections*, p. 116.

⁴² Edwards, *Religious Affections*, p. 117.